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Abstract This article presents the development of the phenomenological move-
ment in Poland in the period 1895–1945. It focuses on the early reactions to phe-
nomenology and the later consolidation of the group of phenomenologists in Lvov.
The article also explores the context of Polish phenomenology, its main figures, and
their texts. The author suggests that early phenomenology in Poland was a plural-
istic discipline that developed in polemical discussions, including discussions with
members of the Lvov–Warsaw school. Finally, the article summarizes the major
contributions of phenomenologists to philosophy, psychology, and aesthetics in
Poland.
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Introduction
Phenomenology in Poland has a long tradition. This fact has been highlighted by the
recent publication of two important books, namely, a bibliography of Polish works
related to Husserl (Be˛ben and Ples-Be˛ben 2013a) and a collection of selected
articles connected to or using phenomenology and published in the pre-war period
(Be˛ben and Ples-Be˛ben 2013b). Following Głombik (1999a, 2005, 2011), both
books show that the very first Polish thinker who refered to Husserl was Władysław
Heinrich (1869–1957), who published his review of Husserl’s Philosophie der
Arithmetik in German as early as 1895. In turn, the first text on Husserl in Polish was
published in 1904 by Jan Łukasiewicz (1878–1956), a prominent member of the
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Lvov–Warsaw school. These basic facts are, however, not very well known. Even
more, the contributions of early Polish phenomenology to, and its influence on,
contemporary philosophy have remained rather unexplored, and they are usually
reduced to Roman Ingarden’s (1893–1970) philosophy.1
In this article I aim to provide an introduction to the context, main figures, and
texts of the phenomenological movement in Poland in the period 1895–1945. In
addition, I seek to present the main trends of early Polish phenomenology in order,
on this basis, to formulate a diagnosis of the pre-war phenomenological movement
in Poland. A further aim is to show that phenomenology in Poland has been a
pluralistic movement that has known centers, e.g., figures such as Ingarden, but also
peripheries, in this way deepening our understanding of what phenomenology was
and can be. Phenomenology in Poland has been indeed a rich and complex
movement. It was shaped in and through a lively dialog, and this included a critical
confrontation with the Lvov–Warsaw school. At the same time, the scope of
phenomenology in Poland is irreducible to academic philosophy or to the single
discipline of philosophy. To the contrary, phenomenology has also been present,
even prominent, in artistic, psychological, and sociological circles. Even more, due
to historical circumstances, phenomenology was engaged in political contexts.
Investigating this latter aspect, Gubser (2014) claims that phenomenology
determined a part of the theoretical basis for Solidarity and resistance to the
communist regime in Poland in the 1970s and 1980s. Thus research into
phenomenology in Poland is a question of different areas of interests, periods,
topics, and focuses. Indeed, Be˛ben (2012) defines five stages in the development of
the phenomenological movement in Poland: (1) first reactions (1895–1918), (2) the
Lvov Circle (1919–1945), (3) the Cracow and Lublin Circles (1946–1970), (4) the
period from Ingarden’s death to the fall of communism (1971–1989), and (5)
contemporary phenomenology (1990–present). This periodization is a useful tool
for understanding Polish phenomenology because it combines historical and
systematic aspects of the phenomenon. In the following account, I will focus on the
first and second stages to which I give the name ‘‘early phenomenology.’’
First reactions: 1895–1918
Although Husserl’s early work Philosophie der Arithmetik (1891) is usually
regarded as a pre-phenomenological work that develops an account of the concept
of number based mainly and mostly on descriptive psychology, it does contain some
ideas that came to be included in the foundation of mature phenomenology.
Reacting constructively to criticism, Husserl soon resolved to overcome the
psychologism afflicting his early work. In this connection, his Logische Unter-
suchungen (1900/1901) was a breakthrough work, because here Husserl formulated
the main arguments against psychologism in logic and laid a methodological basis
for phenomenology. This widely discussed work brought fame to its author, and it
1 Cf. Spiegelberg (1999), Go´rniak-Kocikowska (1997). For critique see Wolen´ski (1999).
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opened for him the path to a professorial position at the University of Go¨ttingen
(1901). In Poland, both works of Husserl raised serious academic interest.
Heinrich published his critical and polemical review of Husserl’s Philosophie der
Arithmetik in Vierteljahrsschrift fu¨r wissenschaftliche Philosophie in 1895. Earlier
he had studied in Zurich and Munich where he wrote his dissertation under Richard
Avenarius (1843–1896). After his return to Poland, he worked at the Jagiellonian
University in Cracow. In the review, written in Vienna, Heinrich focused on
methodological issues. In his view, one can investigate concepts in a twofold
manner, namely either by bringing their different layers of development to clear
insight (klare Einsicht) into their value and scope, or by describing their present
stage of development (Heinrich 1895, 436–437). As Heinrich claims, Husserl
employs the latter method, although it is inadequate because it describes only the
‘‘What’’ (Was) of arithmetical concepts. On the other hand, a more important
question concerns the ‘‘How’’ (Wie) of mathematical concepts. After all, following
Heinrich, concepts are in a state of permanent change and development. By
describing merely the static structure of the concept of number, Husserl in his
Philosophie der Arithmetik was not able to express the complex and dynamic
construction of counting. In a word, Heinrich (1895, 438) recommends a genetic
investigation rather than a static description. He appreciates, of course, Husserl’s
differentiation between a number symbol and a number concept. He emphasizes,
however, that Husserl’s analysis of counting is limited only to some parts of
arithmetic, but cannot be applied to mathematics in general. Głombik (1999a, 150)
notes that there is no evidence that Husserl ever took notice of Heinrich’s review.
Indeed, the secondary literature pays much more attention to Husserl’s reaction to
the famous review of Gottlob Frege (1848–1925).2
Although it seems that Heinrich did not influence him, it may not be an
exaggeration to say that Husserl’s early thought was shaped by another Pole—
Kazimierz Twardowski (1866–1938).3 It is well known that Twardowski’s influence
on Polish philosophy is pervasive. He is commonly regarded as the founder of the
Lvov–Warsaw school of logic (Wolen´ski 1985, 1989). Like Husserl, Twardowski
studied philosophy in Vienna under Franz Brentano (1838–1917). Unlike Husserl,
however, he completed his dissertation under Robert von Zimmermann
(1824–1898).4 Twardowski influenced Husserl in regard to the theory of acts,
and, as a result, in regard to the critique of psychologism. In his early work Zur
Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen (1894), Twardowski argues
2 Cf. Frege (1894), Mohanty (1982), Drummond (1985), McIntyre (1987), Hill and Rosado Haddock
(2000).
3 On Husserl’s interpretation of Twardowski, see Wolen´ski (1997), 15–24. Cavallin claims that
‘‘[a]ctually, Twardowski’s work might even be described as having a ‘triggering’ effect, both for the
development of Husserl’s first version of phenomenology, centered around the criticism of psychologism
in philosophy, and for the second stage of Husserl’s phenomenology, that is ‘pure’ or ‘transcendental’
phenomenology’’ (Cavallin 1997, 29).
4 Husserl studied in Vienna from 1884 to 1886, and Twardowski from 1885 to 1889. Rollinger, who has
investigated the relation between both philosophers, notes that ‘‘[d]uring the year 1885, when Husserl and
Twardowski were both studying under Brentano, they must have had some contact with each other. But
the complete lack of information about any such contact suggests that the relation need not have been a
close one’’ (Rollinger 1999, 139).
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that an ‘‘immanent phenomenon’’ such as a mental act must be regarded as
involving three elements: content, object, and presentation (Twardowski 1894, 3).
The object is irreducible to the act, but the act refers to its object by virtue of its
content. Husserl discussed this theory while working on the theory of intentional
objects and his critique of psychologism, and moreover, he reviewed Twardowski’s
Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen.5 Twardowski had also a
strong influence on phenomenology in Poland. For example, he encouraged his
Lvov students, including Ingarden, Bronisław Bandrowski (1879–1914),6 Stefan
Błachowski (1889–1962),7 and Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (1890–1963)8 to study
philosophy in Go¨ttingen. Another student of his, Stanisław Les´niewski
(1886–1939), who is known for the construction of three nested formal systems,
regarded Husserl’s philosophy as one of the sources of his own view of philosophy.9
Yet it was Łukasiewicz, a student of Twardowski, a logician, and an interpreter of
Aristotle’s syllogistic, who published the first work on Husserl in Polish. In a short
note, he summarized Husserl’s arguments against psychologism, pointing out that
psychological laws are only probable, whereas logical laws are reliable
(Łukasiewicz 1904, 476).10 He formulated two arguments to show that psycholog-
ical laws are probable: (1) they involve real objects, and thus they are based on an
inductive, i.e., probable, manner of inference; and (2) reliable laws are laws in the
case of which negation entails contradiction, but the negation of psychological laws
cannot be contradicted, so that they are only probable (Łukasiewicz 1904, 477).
Łukasiewicz clearly declared that he adopted Husserl’s arguments against
psychologism from his Logische Untersuchungen. Later he enhanced the arguments
by proposing that: (1) psychologism involves content different from that of logic
5 Husserl (1979), 303–356. Cf. Schuhmann (1993), Cavallin (1997), Rollinger (1999) and Mis´kiewicz
(2009).
6 Bardrowski studied for two semesters in Go¨ttingen in 1905/1906. He used phenomenology mainly in
psychology, and, although he accepted Husserl’s anti-psychologism, he was mainly interested in the
theory of imaginary consciousness. He claimed that each mental state is intentional, i.e., it is directed
towards its object due to meaning mediation. Bandrowski used phenomenology in his analysis of the
phenomenon of thinking. Cf. Bandrowski (1907), Głombik (1999a).
7 Błachowski was a psychologist who was connected mainly with the university in Poznan´, though he
cooperated with Twardowski. He studied in Go¨ttingen from 1909 to 1913 under Georg E. Mu¨ller
(1850–1934). He also studied with Husserl. Phenomenological psychology was based for him on
introspection enabling investigation of the psyche itself, regardless of personal feelings or physiological
processes. Cf. Błachowski (1912), Głombik (1999a, 2011), Be˛ben and Ples-Be˛ben (2013b, 61–63).
8 Ajdukiewicz studied for two semesters in Go¨ttingen in 1913/1914. During this period, he cooperated
with Adolf Reinach (1883–1917). Ajdukiewicz was interested more in Reinach’s theory (he prepared for
Reinach a study entitled Ein Beitrag zur Analyse des Bewegungsbegriffes) than in Husserl’s
phenomenology. Nonetheless, one can note Husserl’s influences on Ajdukiewicz’s semantics, especially
in regard to meanings as the essences of meaning-intending acts. Cf. Olech (1995), Głombik
(1999a, 2005, 2011).
9 Les´niewski refers to Husserl several times in his dissertation on existential judgments. He also refers to
Husserl’s interpretation of John Stuart Mill’s (1806–1873) logic, and discusses Husserl’s thesis that one
name can refer to many objects only because of its equivocation. Cf. Wolen´ski (1985, 80, 140),
Les´niewski (1911, 1927, 169).
10 Wolen´ski (2010, 464), who calls this short text of Łukasiewicz ‘‘a classical text in Polish philosophy,’’




(psychological vs. logical content); (2) from the fact that logical operations are
instantiated by psychic actions it does not follow that logic is bound to the human
psyche; and, lastly, (3) psychologism confuses judgment in the sense of a psychic
act with judgment in the sense of a logical proposition (Łukasiewicz 1907,
489–490).
It is worth noting that the first Polish student of Husserl in Go¨ttingen was
Aleksander Rozenblum-Augustowski (1883–1950), who began his studies (under
Heinrich) at the Jagiellonian University in Cracow in 1902. In 1905, he moved to
Go¨ttingen, where he studied for ten semesters. Rozenblum was a co-founder of the
Go¨ttinger Philosophische Gesellschaft in 1907 (Schuhmann 1977, 103). He
participated in Husserl’s seminars, but also in Reinach’s classes. Rozenblum was
interested mainly in the question of the phenomenological method. Later he
cooperated with the Munich Circle.11 In 1908, he presented in Reinach’s seminar a
talk on Łukasiewicz: Analysis and Constitution of the Concept (Schuhmann and
Smith 1987, 14). In his correspondence, Husserl mentions Rozenblum a few
times.12 Rozenblum was a very active member of the Go¨ttingen and Munich
Circles, though he did not publish any text. In 1924, a short note was published that
reported Rozenblum’s talk on Husserl’s theory of knowledge at the meeting of the
Warsaw Philosophical Institute. In this talk, Rozenblum (1924) argued that for
Husserl every theory apprehended as a system of deductively connected proposi-
tions is dogmatic, because it is founded on a petitio principii. This also holds for the
theory of knowledge. For this reason, the theory of knowledge should involve the
idea of knowledge understood as the fulfillment of an empty intention (Rozenblum
1924, 267).
Władysław Tatarkiewicz (1886–1980), a student of the Marburg neo-Kantians
and a member of the Lvov–Warsaw school, published the first comprehensive study
of phenomenology. His article ‘‘Szkoła fenomenologo´w’’ (‘‘The school of
phenomenologists’’) (1913) presented phenomenology both as the phenomenolog-
ical movement initiated by Husserl and as a specific philosophical method. He
understands intuition, as opposed to deduction and induction, as the basis of
phenomenological analysis. According to Tatarkiewicz (1913, 259–260), phe-
nomenology seeks to disclose universal essences that are irreducible to general
concepts. Rather, essences are involved both in general concepts and in individual
beings. A further aim of phenomenology is the description of relations between
essences. Tatarkiewicz appended to his article a list of works of phenomenologists,
including books by Husserl, Reinach, and Pfa¨nder. Tatarkiewicz’s article was
important for the reception of phenomenology in Poland because it did not relate
merely to Husserl’s philosophy in particular, but rather was an attempt to present
phenomenology as a distinct discipline.
11 Alexander Pfa¨nder (1870–1941), one of the leaders of the Munich Circle, emphasized that he
corresponded with Rozenblum. Pfa¨nder also emphasized that Rozenblum (together with Ingarden) was
involved in the project of translating his Logik (1921) and Einfu¨hrung in die Psychologie (1904). Cf.
Pfa¨nder’s letters to Husserl from January 17, 1920, and from May 2, 1921. Cf. Husserl (1994b, 160, 167).
12 Cf. Husserl’s letter to Winthrop Pickard Bell (1884–1965) from August 11, 1920, and letters to
Ingarden from July 18 and December 30, 1920, June 20 and August 6, 1921. Cf. Husserl (1994c, 16, 204,
208, 211–213).
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Though the period 1895–1918 was the beginning of the phenomenological
movement in general, phenomenology resonated throughout Polish academic life in
many respects. Ingarden reviewed the second edition (from 1913) of Husserl’s
Logische Untersuchungen.13 Rozenblum attempted to translate the work, but he
eventually abandoned the project.14 In addition, Konstanty Michalski15
(1879–1947) and Joachim Metallman16 (1889–1942) referred to some elements
Husserl’s theory of knowledge. During this period, Polish thinkers tried not only to
define the basic concepts and methods of phenomenology, or to engage in initial
polemics, but also, and first of all, they tried to use phenomenology as a
methodological tool. At this point, phenomenology encountered its first criticisms in
Poland: (1) it was accused of using difficult, technical vocabulary, and, as a result,
of being a vague philosophy; (2) its critique of the sciences was regarded as
misguided because sciences simply are successful; and (3) its arguments were
judged inconclusive and lacking in impact on psychology.17 Thus the first reactions
to phenomenology in Poland encompass not only commentaries on many aspects of
phenomenological philosophy but also constructive criticism of it.
The Lvov circle: 1919–1945
The second phase of the development of phenomenology in Poland had a central
figure, namely Ingarden, and it is closely connected to his teaching activities at
Lvov University. We˛grzecki (2001, 17) calls this period the ‘‘Lvov period,’’ and
claims that during this time phenomenology had only local influence, and was
generally unknown in Warsaw, Cracow, or in Vilnius. Ingarden earned his doctorate
with a dissertation on Bergson under Husserl at the University of Freiburg in 1918.
After world war I, he returned to Poland, and already in 1919 he published an
13 In his review, Ingarden focuses on changes that Husserl introduced to the first edition of his work
(1900/1901). According to Ingarden, Husserl changed his understanding of phenomenology, because,
whereas in the first edition phenomenology was regarded as descriptive psychology, in the second edition
it was rather transcendental philosophy, which focused on pure consciousness and the essences of pure
experiences as such. One can notice this change, according to Ingarden, with respect to Husserl’s
discussion with Locke and Hume. Cf. Ingarden (1915).
14 Rozenblum suspended his plan to translate Husserl because he was informed that Les´niewski was
already undertaking a similar initiative. Cf. Głombik (1999a, 56–62, 1999b).
15 Michalski was a philosopher and historian of philosophy. He completed his dissertation at the Higher
Institute of Philosophy in Leuven in 1911. He focused on Husserl’s reaction to psychologism. Later,
between 1931 and 1932, he was elected Rector of the Jagiellonian University in Cracow. Cf. Michalski
(1911).
16 Metallman was a student of Heinrich at the Jagiellonian University. His work was on the principle of
economics as defined by Avenarius and Ernst Mach (1838–1916). The principle claims that the process of
thinking is teleological, and that it strives to achieve its aim by exerting minimal efforts. According to
Metallman, Husserl’s idea of the symbolization of thought corresponds to an understanding of logic as an
instantiation of thought economics. Cf. Metallman (1914).
17 The arguments were formulated by Bronisław Biegeleisen (1881–1963), a philosopher and
psychologist who worked at the Lvov Technical University. He engaged with Husserl’s idea of
philosophy as a rigorous science. Husserl published his essay Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft in
1911. Cf. Biegeleisen (1913).
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important two-part study entitled ‘‘Da˛ _zenia fenomenologo´w’’ [‘‘The aims of
phenomenologists’’] which popularized phenomenology in Poland as a distinct
philosophical current (Tatarkiewicz 1971, 131). This pair of articles (Ingarden
1919a, b) represents a comprehensive historical and systematic study of the main
topics of phenomenology, including (1) Husserl’s early psychologism in his
Philosophie der Arithmetik, (2) the critique of psychologism in logic, (3) the
phenomenological requirement to limit analysis to direct experience, (4) the
descriptive manner of investigation, (5) the a priori basis of the analysis of essences,
and (6) a transcendental reformulation of phenomenology by the method of
reduction that avoids the petitio principii problem. For Ingarden, the aims of the
phenomenologists ultimately involve systematic and rigorous descriptions of the
different domains of objects, and, as a result, the formulation of a formal and
material ontology. Though the two articles did not raise the realism-idealism
controversy directly, they indicated several pivotal issues that later defined
Ingarden’s critique of Husserl, for example, the question of the ontological
neutrality of the reduction (Ingarden 1919b, 348–349). As is well known, Ingarden
charged transcendental phenomenology with being a philosophy that leads towards
metaphysical idealism.18 In any case, Ingarden emerged as a key figure of this
period, both as a proponent and as a critic of phenomenology.
After his return from Germany, Ingarden worked as a teacher in a secondary
school in Torun´ and later (from 1925 on) as a docent at Lvov University. Although
Husserl interceded on his behalf to help him obtain a full position in Lvov at that
time,19 it was only in 1933 that Ingarden was given a chair. In the 1920s, Ingarden
attempted to translate Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen into Polish, but the
project did not meet with a favorable response from publishers.20 In the 1930s,
Ingarden was already an internationally recognized scholar on the basis of his book
Das literarische Kunstwerk (1931). In Lvov, by contrast, he felt himself a solitary
phenomenological researcher, because logic was still the dominant discipline of
philosophy (Kron´ska 1972, 62). In spite of this circumstance, he eventually
established a group of talented scholars and researchers who though not necessarily
his direct students developed phenomenology in new directions. As a result, the
Lvov Circle of phenomenologists included psychologists, philosophers, and
aestheticians, for example Salomon Igel (1889–1942),21 Walter Auerbach
18 The controversy defined the later reception of phenomenology in Poland in general. Cf. Ingarden’s
letter to Husserl (1994c, 183–200) from 1918. Cf. also Ingarden (1929a), Krzemicka (1939), Tischner
(1972), Galarowicz (1982a, b), Wallner (1987), Bostar (1994) and Bielawka (2011).
19 Cf. Husserl’s letter to Twardowski from July 13, 1928. Husserl (1994a, 181).
20 Ingarden tried to publish the translation in Lvov and in Warsaw. In this connection, he corresponded
with Twardowski and Rozenblum. The publishers claimed that the vocabulary Husserl used in his book
was too difficult, and, in addition, they wanted to support original contributions rather than mere
translations. Cf. Głombik (1999a, 62–64, 1999b).
21 Igel was a student of Twardowski. He focused on the problem of feelings and referenced theories of
Brentano and Husserl. He claimed that feelings are based on representations but that some of them have
propositional character. Feelings, as Igel stated, are objective acts, i.e., they are object-directed. In this
connection, he engaged not only with Brentano and Husserl (with his Logische Untersuchungen), but also
with Twardowski, Pfa¨nder, Theodor Lipps (1851–1914), Alexius Meinong (1853–1920), Paul Natorp
(1854–1924), and Moritz Geiger (1888–1937). It is worth noting that Igel derived phenomenology from
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(1900–1942),22 Tadeusz Witwicki (1902–1970),23 Zofia Lissa (1908–1980),24 and
Leopold Blaustein (1905–1942).25 It is worth noting that Blaustein is the author of
the first monograph in Polish on Husserl’s phenomenology: Husserlowska nauka o
akcie, tres´ci i przedmiocie przedstawienia (Blaustein 1928) [Husserl’s Theory of the
Act, Content, and the Object of the Presentation]. The book is a critical elaboration
of Husserl’s theory of act consciousness. Blaustein accepts Husserl’s method of
eidetic description, but he rejects the requirement that phenomenology has to
suspend reference to the history of philosophy. Although he is critical of Husserl’s
method, he describes consciousness in terms of an intentional act that, following
Husserl and Twardowski, contains both a presentational content and the object of a
presentation. According to Blaustein (1928), Husserl did not differentiate consis-
tently between experience and experiencing, and for this reason he cannot
distinguish an experienced sensation from the act of sensation. As a result,
experienced data are reduced to immanent experiences, and thus the object is
reduced to an immanent object of consciousness itself. In Ingarden’s (1929b, 316)
view, Blaustein is not clear enough on this, because Husserl did indeed differentiate
between experienced data and aspects (Abschattungen) of objects. If that is the case,
then Husserl also distinguished consistently between the objective and the
subjective aspects of experience.
The publication of Ingarden’s Das literarische Kunstwerk (1931) was the
beginning of the reception of phenomenology in aesthetics (e.g., Chwistek 1932;
Kron´ski 1933; Blaustein 1935) as well as in artistic circles. In this connection,
Blaustein (1930b, 1933, 1935b/1936) presented original but polemical studies on
imaginative representations in art and on the cinema. In addition, the Polish avant-
garde painter, writer, and philosopher Stanisław Ignacy Witkiewicz (a.k.a. Witkacy)
(1885–1939) criticized Husserl’s philosophy for being an abstract and static theory
of consciousness. In his view, Husserl’s major error was the reduction of the lived
body. The transcendental ego, he argued (Witkiewicz and Ingarden 2002, 32–33), is
an ephemeral ghost. Briefly, phenomenology leads towards metaphysical idealism
that cannot describe the real world in terms of a bodily experience. For similar
reasons, Witkacy criticized neo-positivism, and as a result he formulated a quasi-
Leibnizian monadology that comprehends the lived body as a substance and a
monad (cf. Witkiewicz 2002a, b).
Footnote 21 continued
the philosophy of Carl Stumpf (1848–1936), a psychologist, a member of the Munich Circle, and the
thinker to whom Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen were dedicated. Cf. Igel (1919, 1922).
22 Auerbach was a student of Twardowski, Ingarden, and Tadeusz Kotarbin´ski (1886–1981). He
presented an interesting analysis of doubting by arguing that Husserl’s reduction of doubting to
questioning is unjustified. He understood phenomenology mainly as descriptive psychology, but his
project was interdisciplinary and analytical. Cf. Auerbach (1931).
23 Witwicki was a philosopher, psychologist, and teacher. In his writings, he discussed the
phenomenological aspects of representation and investigated the character of act contents and its
relation to the object. Cf. Witwicki (1931).
24 Lissa adapted Ingarden’s theory of literary artwork to musicology and film studies. Cf. Lissa (1937),
Helman (1975).
25 Blaustein was a student of Twardowski, Ajdukiewicz, and Ingarden. He also studied in Freiburg under
Husserl in 1925. Cf. Blaustein (1930a), Rosin´ska (2005), Miskiewicz (2009).
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Phenomenology in Poland during the period 1919–1945 can be regarded as a
consolidated philosophical movement that was developed by means of a series of
polemics, studies, and discussions.26 The main area of research focused on the
mental act in relation to its content and object. Yet phenomenology was also
developed in new directions. For example, Czesław Znamierowski (1888–1967)
developed Reinach’s theory of social acts (Znamierowski 1921) and Eugeniusz
Bautro (1891–1961) analyzed the reception of Husserl’s theory in the philosophy of
law (Bautro 1926). At the same time, phenomenology in Poland was open to
international cooperation. For example, Tadeusz Kron´ski (1907–1958) held a
fellowship in Prague in 1937/1938, where he worked together with Jan Patocˇka
(1907–1977). Kron´ski (1939) published a critical review of Patocˇka’s Prˇirozenysveˇt
jako filisoficky´ problem (1936) [The Natural World as a Philosophical Problem], in
which he claimed that in fact Patocˇka’s theory represents a version of idealism
because he emphasized time over the real existence of the world. This period ends
with world war II, which occasioned a dramatic breakdown of the phenomenolog-
ical movement in Poland. Auerbach, Blaustein, Metallman, and Witkiewicz, for
instance, died or were killed during the war. In addition, Ingarden could no longer
teach at the university, though he worked on his magnum opus, published after the
war, Spo´r o istnienie s´wiata, vol. I (Ingarden 1947) [Controversy over the Existence
of the World]. Post-war Poland, however, was a completely different state, a
communist country in which phenomenology was relentlessly criticized by Marxist-
Leninist thinkers for its allegedly idealist and bourgeois character.27
Conclusion
Early phenomenology in Poland was developed as a reaction to the first
phenomenological works published in Germany. The reception of Husserl’s
philosophy began in 1895 (Heinrich), but the Munich Circle was also a popular
point of reference (Rozenblum, Tatarkiewicz, Igel). Of course, the reception was not
passive but critical (Biegeleisen, Chwistek, Witkiewicz), and in turn it influenced
Husserl (Twardowski, Ingarden). Phenomenology in Poland flourished as a
pluralistic field of research that encompassed many distinct but intertwined topics
and disciplines. Polish phenomenologists discussed classical issues of phenomenol-
ogy, such as the structure of the acts of consciousness, the possibilities of the method
of reduction, and the question of psychologism (Heinrich, Bandrowski, Łukasiewicz,
Michalski, Ingarden, Blaustein, Bautro). In this connection, one can identify multiple
26 Leon Chwistek (1884–1944), who interacted with Ingarden, accused phenomenology of obscurity, of
using a poetic vocabulary, and of confusing logic with semantics. Cf. Chwistek (1922).
27 Ingarden became a professor at the Jagiellonian University in Cracow in 1946, but between 1949 and
1957 he was banned from teaching because he was regarded as an ‘‘enemy of materialism.’’ A good
example of the shift in the understanding of phenomenology is found in Kron´ski’s review of Ingarden’s
Controversy over the Existence of the World. Kron´ski (1952) argued, as he had earlier done against
Patocˇka, that Ingarden’s theory is so-called ‘‘objective idealism,’’ but he formulated an additional
political argument by claiming that Ingarden’s work does not correspond to the proletariat’s interests
adequately, and, moreover, that it represents the ‘‘bankruptcy of bourgeois philosophy.’’ On the Marxist
critique of phenomenology, see Martel (1967) and Łozin´ski (1975).
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formulations of phenomenology as descriptive psychology (Twardowski, Ban-
drowski, Błachowski, Igel, Auerbach, Witwicki) or as transcendental philosophy
(Ingarden, Witkiewicz, Blaustein). Phenomenology was used or discussed with
regard to epistemology (Rozenblum, Metallman, Ingarden, Blaustein, Witkiewicz),
ontology (Ingarden, Krzmicka (Korn´ska), Kron´ski, Witkiewicz), logic and semantics
(Ajdukiewicz, Les´niewski, Łukasiewicz, Chwistek), aesthetics (Ingarden, Chwistek,
Lissa, Blaustein, Kron´ski), and social philosophy (Znamierowski, Bautro).
In the end, however, early phenomenology in Poland seems to have been shaped
by two leading thinkers, namely, Twardowski and Ingarden. Although he was not a
phenomenologist at all, Twardowski inspired and defined Polish phenomenology as
focused on the question of psychologism and that of the relationship between act,
content, and object. Especially the problem of content, which was widely discussed
by Polish philosophers, appears to have been a typical topic of early phenomenol-
ogy in Poland. A direct but critical student of Husserl,28 Ingarden merged and
melded basic phenomenological terminology and Polish philosophical vocabulary
and determined the later reception of phenomenology in Poland as concentrated on
the realism–idealism controversy. Briefly, Ingarden taught phenomenology how to
speak Polish. Although early phenomenology in Poland had its typical topics and
problems, it is probably inaccurate to claim that the early phenomenological
movement in Poland had the recognizable character of a philosophical school. We
can, of course, indicate the main figures of early phenomenology in Poland, for
example, Rozenblum, Ingarden, and Blaustein; by claiming this, I want to
emphasize that during the period 1895–1945 only Ingarden seems to be a
phenomenologist tout court. In turn, Rozenblum and Blaustein were prominent
members of the phenomenological movement, however, they used also other
methods than the phenomenological one, e.g., descriptive psychology, and the
analytic method. Furthermore, such philosophers as Ajdukiewicz, Les´niewski or
Łukasiewicz were not phenomenologists, but logicians and members of the Lvov-
Warsaw school; nonetheless, they referred to some phenomenological ideas. Lastly,
then, during the early period there was no Polish school of phenomenologists
parallel to, for instance, the Lvov-Warsaw school.29 Yet, as this article shows, the
collective contributions of the early Polish phenomenologists constitute an excellent
enhancement of the invaluable heritage of Polish philosophy.
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28 Husserl (1994c, 253) called Ingarden ‘‘the dearest and most faithful of my older disciples’’.
29 Tischner (1981, 21) suggests that Ingarden’s philosophy was not popular before 1939 because of the
dominant position of the Lvov–Warsaw school. We˛grzecki (2001, 12–13) and Duchlin´ski (2011, 371)
repeat Tischner’s opinion, and they both claim that world war II made it impossible to further develop
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